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Abstract
The ongoing COVID-19 epidemic poses a difficult decision making situation: Too light or late
measures to control the epidemic might lead to high casualties and human suffering, too heavy
measures might cause economic damage, which in turn can have far-reaching effects on human
health and quality of life. Optimization is a widely used technique for dealing with complex de-
cision making situations. Combined with epidemic and economic modeling, it can help decision
makers in choosing efficient strategies for epidemic control.
In this work, we propose a modeling approach to support decision making with regards to
timing and strength of lockdown and testing measures. The approach combines optimization with a
compartmental epidemic model to account for both spread of the disease and the role of testing and
interventions, including contact tracing, in mitigating it. We provide a framework for optimizing
epidemic control strategies and highlight main implications for the cases similar to COVID-19.
1 Foreword
This report describes the research I completed during the 2020 Young Scientists Summer Program
at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. As such, it has limitations in scope and
detail of analysis and has not passed peer review. It is my intent to extend this work into a peer
reviewed article together with my supervisors.
This work has been performed under the supervision of Dr. Matthias Wildemeersch, to whom
I wish to express my warmest thanks for his welcoming attitude and inspiring collaboration. I also
wish to thank my PhD supervisor Dr. Eeva Vilkkumaa, who has contributed to this work through
critique and discussion.
2 Introduction
The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) caused by the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus
2 (SARS-CoV-2) has spread to nearly every country in the world since it first emerged in China
in December 2019. By October 15th 2020, it has caused over 38 million confirmed cases and
over one million deaths worldwide. To mitigate further spread of the disease, governments have
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adopted different kinds of epidemic control strategies. These strategies can be roughly divided into
testing and contact restriction (’lockdown’) strategies, and combinations thereof. Testing strategies
include contact tracing, testing even slightly symptomatic people, and immunity or antiviral testing.
Lockdown strategies include limitations on the operation of schools and non-essential businesses,
cancellation of mass events, and issuing stay-at-home orders. Mask wearing regulations can also
be counted as lockdown measures.
The extensive testing of the population would make it possible to curb the spread of disease
through identifying carriers with little to no symptoms. This would help target isolation and quar-
antine measures to those people who are known to have the disease or having been exposed to
it, which would limit the economic and social impact of these measures compared to large-scale
lockdown strategies. Nevertheless, the efficacy of such strategies may be constrained by imperfect
testing, i.e., the non-zero probability of obtaining false negative or positive results. Furthermore,
testing capacity is often limited by the availability of tests and testing personnel. In the absence suf-
ficient testing capacity during the first wave of the pandemic, countries such as Germany, Finland,
and Thailand adopted relatively aggressive lockdown strategies and, consequently, experienced
limited numbers of cases and low death rates. Yet, such strategies may cause significant economic
damage, which can have far-reaching effects on human health and quality of life. Moreover, as
demonstrated by previous studies, the influence of lockdown strategies is highly dependent on the
magnitude and timing of such strategies: their impact in terms of controlling the spread of an
epidemic is limited if introduced too late or lifted too early.
In view of the above, one of the key questions faced by policy makers during an epidemic is
how to choose and implement epidemic control measures in a way that would mitigate the spread
of disease while minimizing the economic impact subject to limited testing capacity. The most
common approach to studying such questions is to simulate an epidemiological model to assess
the impacts of different kinds of control strategies. In epidemiological models, members of the
population are assumed to be in a given state or compartment with regard to the epidemic. In
SEIR models, for instance, these compartments are susceptible (S), exposed (E), infected (I), and
recovered (R). Epidemiological models can be further divided into agent-based and equation-based
models. Agent-based models can capture the effects of changes in individual behavior and local
interactions on the spread of the epidemic and, thereby, capture high-level patterns emerging from
individual behavior (see e.g. [6]).
The main challenge with the use of agent-based models is that they require large amounts of data
and are computationally intensive. Consequently, many authors suggest the use of equation-based
models, which are more simplified in that they seek to capture average flows between different
compartments instead of tracking individuals. Although equation-based models cannot capture the
effects of individual behavior, they are rather suitable for studying the impacts of policy changes
in cases where reliable data on individual behavior cannot be acquired. Berger et al. (2020)[2],
for instance, propose an equation-based SEIR model to evaluate the impacts of simple testing and
conditional quarantine policies on the spread of coronavirus, number of deaths caused by Covid-19,
and economic output, as measured by the share of overall contribution to the workforce compared
to a baseline case where no-one is symptomatic or in quarantine. In doing so, they extend the basic
SEIR framework to accommodate incomplete information on whether an asymptomatic member
of the population is in fact infected or not. Using this model, they show that testing at a higher
rate in conjunction with targeted quarantine policies can (i) dampen the economic impact of the
coronavirus and (ii) reduce peak symptomatic infections. Yet, the model assumes that testing is
done at a fixed rate with no constraints on testing capacity, and that tests are perfectly accurate (i.e.,
no false negative or positive results exist).
In the above approaches, epidemic control strategies are not optimized in a mathematical sense,
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but rather a few predetermined strategies are compared to one another in terms of their outcomes
on relevant objectives. Consequently, such approaches may suggest strategies that are either unaf-
fordable due to a lack of constraint on testing capacity, or suboptimal in that, for instance, testing
resources could be reallocated to achieve a better outcome with respect to spread of disease and
economic output. Below we highlight some of the approaches used to combine complex systems
and optimization.
In case the simulator at hand is stochastic, approaches can fall under Simulation Optimiza-
tion (SO), where complex simulation models are combined with an optimization methodology to
achieve improved, or in some cases optimal performance of the simulated system in a statistical
sense. The methods can range from simply comparing simulation runs to recursive and iterative
approaches combined with e.g. gradient search methods to evolutionary algorithms. A relatively
recent review of state of the art can be found in (Amaran2014).
In (Alistar 2014) the authors were able to optimize a simple HIV epidemic model by exploiting
the problem structure and some reasonable assumptions. However, this approach becomes harder
to apply as the epidemic model becomes more complex. Oversimplification of the epidemic model
may lead to irrelevant or impaired results from application point of view.
Optimal Control Theory can be used to optimize the performance of a continuous or discrete
time system through control parameters as in e.g. works by Tragler [8] and Lefèvre [5]. In these
models, the spread if the disease and controls are often modeled through differential equations, and
the controls are optimized using numerical approaches or analytically.
One way to overcome complexity is to reduce the epidemic model to a metamodel, that can then
be optimized using well known optimization approaches, such as stochastic optimization or linear
optimization. However, reducing an epidemic into an algebraic model is challenging and still risks
losing some of the dynamics of the original model. One example of this kind of approach is in (De
Angelis, 2003).
In case the model to be optimized is complex and there is no willingness or reasonable approach
to simplify it, one can resort to heuristic optimization. The benefit of using heuristics is that these
methods are able to handle complex, even black box objective functions and constraints. In [4],
a coupled system dynamics model comprised of differential equations is optimized using pattern
search. The result is recommendations for screening and treatment policies for HIV epidemic.
Saurabh et al. [7] use the NSGA-II algorithm to minimize deaths and economic impacts through
state specific lockdown policies for India.
The contribution of this paper to epidemic control optimization is 3-fold. First, we introduce
a multi-objective optimization approach to concurrently optimize timing and strength of control
measures in a deterministic epidemic process modeled as a 12-state compartmental model. Sec-
ond, we introduce imperfect testing and a novel approach to modeling contact tracing (CT) using
compartmental models. Finally, we combine these to derive policy insights for COVID-19 type
epidemics.
3 Model description
In this section we present our model framework for controlling an epidemic. In particular, Sec-
tion 3.1 introduces the compartmental model that is used to capture the spread of the epidemic
subject to control measures regarding lockdown and testing. In Section 3.2 we formulate a mul-
tiobjective optimization problem for optimizing these control measures in view of minimizing the
number of deaths, lost working hours, and direct costs. Section 3.3 presents the Non-dominated
Sorting Genetic Algorithm II that is used to solve the set of Pareto optimal solutions with respect
to the two objectives.
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Figure 1: Extended SEIR compartmental epidemic model.
3.1 Epidemic model
Figure 1 illustrates the compartmental model that we use to simulate the progression of the epi-
demic in different circumstances and with different control measures. This model comprises 12
compartments (depicted in the figure by rectangles, and explained in 2), each of which describes a
potential status for a given member of the population in terms of infection, quarantine and informa-
tion state. Transitions between these compartments are depicted by arrows between the rectangles
and formalized mathematically as a transition matrix T in table 3. The general and transition pa-
rameters of the model are listed in tables 1 and 4, respectively.
Table 1: General epidemic simulation parameters (see also 3)
Symbol value description
pop 340 000 000 Population. Used mainly for illustrative purposes, based on U.S.
population[2]
Tyears 2 Simulation time in years
Iinitial 300 number of initial infections at t = 0
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3.1.1 Compartments
Table 2: Compartments in the epidemic model
NANQ Not infected asymptomatic non-quarantined: susceptible to infection but not yet in-
fected. They are not quarantined, so they contribute fully to output. Their status is
not known to the healthcare system.
NAQ Not infected asymptomatic quarantined: susceptible to infection but not yet infected.
They are quarantined, so their output is reduced by λQ. Their status is not known to
the healthcare system.
NANQ∗ Not infected asymptomatic non-quarantined, known: susceptible to infection but not
yet infected. They are not quarantined, so they contribute fully to output. Their status
is known currently.
IANQ Infected asymptomatic non-quarantined: can spread the disease to others. They are
not quarantined, so they contribute fully to output and new infections. Their status is
not known to the healthcare system.
IAQ Infected asymptomatic non-quarantined: can spread the disease to others. They are
quarantined, so their contribution to output and new infections is reduced. Their status
is not known to the healthcare system.
IAQ∗ Infected asymptomatic non-quarantined: can spread the disease to others. They are
quarantined, so their contribution to output and new infections is reduced . Their
status is known to the healthcare system.
FPQ False positive: received a false positive result from testing and are thus assumed to be
infected by the health care system, even though they are in fact not infected. Due to
the positive result, they are quarantined and their contribution to output is reduced.
FNNQ False negative: received a false negative result from testing. Assumed to be non-
infectious and are thus not quarantined. Contribute fully to new infections and output.
ISQ Infected symptomatic quarantined: have an infection and have developed symptoms.
Their state is known to the healthcare system and they are quarantined.
RNQ Recovered non-quarantined: Have been infected and recovered from that infection.
They have temporary immunity to new infections.
RQ Recovered quarantined: Have been infected and recovered from that infection. They
have temporary immunity to new infections. Reduced contribution to output.
D Deceased. Permanently removed from output.
If a person has been tested and is known to be uninfected, we assume that they are not quaran-
tined. Likewise, if a person has been tested and is known to be infected, we assume that they are
quarantined. Also, the status of a person who is infected and symptomatic is assumed to be known,
whereby this person is quarantined.
Recovery includes a limited immunity period. If symptomatic infected persons do not recover,
they die by transitioning to deceased state (D). We only account for deaths due to COVID-19, other
causes are excluded. Table 2 includes descriptions of compartments.
3.1.2 Transitions
Transition flows between the 12 compartments are captured by the transition parameters listed in
Table 4. The third column of this table contains the base case values. These values can change over
time due to, e.g., applied control measures. Unless stated otherwise, we use the base case values in
all of our analyses.
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The transitions between compartments are shown in 3. The rows represent compartments from
which transitions happen to the target compartments, represented by columns. For instance, per-
sons currently in false positive (FP ) compartment can move to compartment NANQ at rate ωR
and to IAQ∗ at rate λQαt. The first of these transitions represents a situation where a false pos-
itive person has been quarantined, naturally without symptoms, for long enough that they can be
assumed recovered and thus will be released. The latter represent the situation where they actually
get infected, and become true positives. People can transition to FP fromNANQ at rate τ(1−q−)
(as part of a general testing scheme) and from NAQ at rate (τ +τCT )(1−q−), i.e either after being
tested in a general scheme or through contact tracing.
Due to the relative short time horizon, no birth rate nor natural death rate is considered and
the sum of all compartments equals N . Let X(t) = [NANQ(t), NAQ(t), NANQ∗(t), IANQ(t),
IAQ(t), IAQ∗(t), FPQ(t), FNNQ(t), ISQ(t), RNQ(t), RQ(t), D(t)], then we state dynamics
can be written shortly as
X(t+ 1) = SEIR+(X(t), X(t− 1), X(t− 2), λ, τ, η)
= Tt(X(t), X(t− 1), X(t− 2), λ, τ, η)X(t) (1)
3.1.3 Contact tracing
Contact tracing (a.k.a. test and trace) is an epidemic control strategy based on identifying infected
persons through symptoms or testing, tracing their recent contacts and quarantining and subse-
quently testing them. We model this possibility in our epidemic model as described below. As
an example, let us consider the case of a non-infected person meeting an infected and soon-to-be-
diagnosed person, becoming infected by that person and then traced.
The chance of having met such a person on last time step, conditional on a meeting, is
πISTt =





λM IANQt−1 · τ q+ + λQ M
IA−Q
t−1 · (τ + τCT ) q+
M totalt
πFPt =
λMNANQt−1 · τ (1− q−) + λQM
NA−Q
t−1 · (τ + τCT ) (1− q−)
M totalt
(2)
Meeting such a person (out of all meetings) can lead to infections at conditional rate ρS , giving an




S + πIATt−1 ρ
A (3)





and the mass calculated below. This mass is the infected mass that can be traced on the next time




S + πIATt−1 ρ
A)MNANQt−1 (5)







S + πIAt ρ
A] (6)
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Table 3: Epidemic model transition matrix Tt
NANQ NAQ NANQ∗ IANQ IAQ IAQ∗ FPQ FNNQ ISQ RNQ RQ D
NANQ ξCT,N τq− λLDλαt τ(1− q−)
NAQ rU (τ + τCT )q− λQαt (τ + τ
CT )(1− q−)
NANQ∗ σ λLDλαt
IANQ ξCT,I τq+ τ(1− q+) δ ωR







from where they may proceed to IAQ, based on the tracing efficiency η.
This means that only part of the ’new arrivals’ , and therefore also only part of the total mass in
IANQ are subject to potential tracing efforts. Also, at this point the chance that they have already
met an infected person is accounted for (because we know they have, that’s how they got infected).
Considering the share of these new members in the whole group of infected persons in IANQ leads
to transition rate of:
ξCT,I = ηM ITt /M
IANQ
t (7)
to IAQ. Fully extended, this becomes:
ξCT,I = η · λρS






The same approach can be applied to meeting a newly diagnosed infected person and getting traced
but not infected, and for getting traced while being in RNQ, and thus immune:
For the non-infected, the process moves on similarly to the one above. Instead of infection
chance, one only needs to consider the complement, and instead of target compartment IANQ, the
compartment NANQ. This gives:






t−1 (1− ρS) + πIATt−1 (1− ρA) + πFPt−1)M
NANQ
t−1 (10)
The quarantine rates for the recovered are modeled by assuming that they have met the tracing-
initiating person while already recovered. This gives:













Another way to formulate this would be to build pass-through compartments for ’traceable’
IANQ, NANQ and RNQ that would be kept separate from the ’main’ IANQ, NANQ and RNQ
compartments. The only transitions to quarantine through test and trace would then be from these
’traceable’ compartments with rate η. The remaining population members would transition to the
’main’ compartments because their ’traceability’ would be lost.
3.2 Optimization model formulation
We consider as objectives the minimization of the number of deaths D and the economic and
healthcare related costs over the considered time horizon C. Let u = {λ, τ, η}, then the optimization












Ce(t, λ, τ, η) + S
T
C (T, λ, τ, η) (14)
subject to X(t+ 1) = SEIR+(X(t), X(t− 1), X(t− 2), λ, τ, η) (15)
Ntests(u, t) ≤ Nmaxtests(t), ∀ t ∈ T, u ∈ A (16)
(17)
Table 4: Transition matrix parameter descripitions
Symbol description base case source
∆t Simulation time step. Current value estimates
active hours per day (assumption that no infec-
tions while sleeping and otherwise inactive).
14 [2]
ξUt Quarantine rate for unknown states 0.00 assumed
ξCT,Nt Contact tracing based quarantine rate for non-
infected
f(t,X) estimated (9)
ξCT,It Contact tracing based quarantine rate for in-
fected
f(t,X) estimated (7)
ξCT,Rt Contact tracing based quarantine rate for recov-
ered
f(t,X) estimated (11)
τ Testing rate applied to all unknown states 0.0 control
τCT Contact tracing based testing rate, applied to
those in quarantine states. Cumulative with τt
0.0 assumed
λ Meeting rate for persons not in quarantine or
affected by lockdown measures [meetings per
time step]
1.0 assumed, [2]
λQ Meeting rate for persons in quarantine 0.5 · λ [2]
λLD Meeting rate for persons who are affected by
lockdown measures
0.0 control
αt The probability of infection conditional on
meeting a person.
f(t,X) estimated, [2]
σ Rate of loss of information. Describes the tran-
sition rate from known uninfected to unknown
uninfected in average number of days.
7.0 assumed
δ Rate of symptom development in avg number
of days.
5.0 [2]
γ Loss of immunity. Describes the rate at
which recovered and immune become suscep-
tible again (i.e. lose their immunity) in average
number of days.
180.0 assumed
rU Quarantine release rate for unknown states 0.1 assumed
rR Quarantine release rate for recovered states 0.98 assumed
q+ Testing sensitivity, i.e. true positive rate 1.0 chosen (clarity)
q− Testing specificity, i.e. true negative rate 1.0 chosen (clarity)
ωR Recovery rate for infected in average number of
days
14.0 [2]
πD Probability of death given symptoms 0.01 [2]





The economic cost is represented by a loss of the work force and can be written as
Ce(t, λ, τ, η) = N −
λ
λbase
MNQ(t, λ, τ, η)− λ
Q
λbase
MQ(t, λ, τ, η) (18)
The terminal cost functions STX (T, λ, τ, η) cannot be expressed as an approximation of an infinite
horizon problem over the interval [T,∞). This would require the introduction of a discount rate,
which is not desirable due to the short time horizon we consider in epidemic control. Assuming a
linear recovery after T , we can therefore define terminal cost functions for each objective account-
ing for the cost that will be incurred after T over the economic recovery time ∆Trec
STD(T, λ, τ, η) =
∆Trec
2
D(T, λ, τ, η) ,






MNQ(T, λ, τ, η)− λ
Q
λbase
MQ(T, λ, τ, η)
)
. (19)
The assumption of linear recovery for all objectives is clearly a simplification, but allows us to
incorporate a consistent logic for all terminal costs.
3.3 Computation of Pareto optimal strategies
To optimize the model above, we used the NSGA-II algorithm distributed in ’pymoo’ (Python
Multi-Objective Optimization) package for Python programming language [1]. The algorithm starts
with a random generated initial set of control vectors (population members) with varied control
variables (λLD(t), τ(t)) and estimates the respective death and output objective values by running
the simulator. After completing one round with a number of different population members, it selects
the best ones (preferring non-dominated solutions) for cross-breeding and mutation thus generating
new control vectors (offspring) based on the best performing ones . The process is then repeated
with a new population composed of both best performers from the previous population and their
offspring. The algorithm then continues until convergence conditions are met or maximum number
of generations reached. The last population is considered as proxy for optimal solution. For details,
see (Deb et al. 2002)[3]. The main parameters affecting the optimization runs are given in the table
5.
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Table 5: Main NSGA-II parameters used in optimization runs.
population size 60 Trial solution population size per generation.
number of offspring 30 number of offspring per generation
mutation real polynomial
with η = 8.0
Mutation operator for population members:
cross-over sbx Crossover operator for population members:
real simulated binary crossover with
0.9 probability
and η = 10.0
sampling real random Initial population generation sampling
elimination of duplicates yes Eliminates duplicate solutions in population
termination criteria default pymoo MultiObjectiveDefaultTermination with
tolerances for changes at:
x tol=1e-8 (decision variables)
cv tol=1e-6 (constraint violations)
f tol=0.0025 (objectives)
nth gen=5 (checked how often)
n last=30 (using last generations)
n max gen=2500 (maximum generations)
n max evals=100000 (maximum evaluations)
4 Case studies and scenarios
To study differences in efficient policies given different decision alternatives, starting conditions
and parameter values, we performed case studies with scenarios. The scenarios play the role of
sensitivity analysis, and cases describe different control approaches. We study the approaches
separately (i.e. only optimizing for lockdown timing and strenght, not testing rate, and vice versa)
to understand their individual characteristics. In addition, we generate and study mixed approach
strategies, i.e. situations where lockdowns and testing are combined. Combinations of following
scenario elements were used case studies:
Epidemic spreads with R0 = 4.0 (instead of R0 = 2.5) The basic reproduction number R0 de-
scribes the aggressiveness of the spread of the disease. A larger R0 implies need for stronger
control measures. Especially, it might have implications on usefulness of testing measures,
given limited testing resources. It is worth noting that a large infection rateR0 = 4.0 together
with the assumption of non-permanent immunity creates a cyclical nature into the epidemic.
This cyclical nature complicates analysis of effects of control measures on outcomes.
Test quality High quality tests used to identify infectious persons have high sensitivity and speci-
ficity values. However, if the availability or price of these tests is prohibitive, lower quality
tests might be an alternative. However, using low sensitivity tests might lead to a high number
of unidentified infectious persons being not quarantined.
Testing resources Testing can generally be seen as a win-win solution to epidemic control as long
as the required number of tests does not grow too high. Different testing limitations thus
imply possibly varying efficient lockdown strategies. Changing testing limitations can also
help in estimating the marginal value of testing resources.
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Delay in symptoms With COVID-19 like epidemics, symptoms may show only after 2 weeks of
becoming infectious. This delay can have significant implications on different quarantine /
lockdown strategies and usefulness of testing.
4.1 Case 1: Optimization of timing and strength of lockdown with fixed test-
ing rates
The purpose of this case is to study Pareto optimal lockdown strategies under varying epidemic
and fixed (not optimized) testing scenarios. The case corresponds to policies selected by many
countries during the COVID-19 epidemic, especially after contact tracing has become unfeasible
due to high infection rates.
4.1.1 Lockdown strategy
Figure 2 presents the Pareto fronts for several different scenarios. Each point in the front represents
a different strategy. In general, the more lockdown measures are used (in strength and/or in time)
the less deaths and output there is and vice versa. The nature of these lockdown strategies is often
fluctuating, i.e. they may stay at relatively strong values (lower λLD but release the lockdown for
some time period, or vice versa.
4.1.2 Effects of imperfect testing
The effects of limited general testing, with perfect and imperfect tests, on lockdown performance
can also be seen in figure 2. It is worthy to note that whereas use of perfect testing expectedly
improves the achievable outcomes, imperfect testing can have a negative impact on outcomes. In
the figure, testing with sensitivity and specificity at 75% produces a similar Pareto front than lock-
down without any testing. The effect of imperfect specificity seems to be stronger than imperfect
sensitivity.
This happens due to the following dynamic: lockdown can be seen as a testing scheme with
perfect sensitivity and zero specificity, where τ = (i.e. the virtual testing rate corresponds to
quarantine rate) and all ’tested’, whether infected or not, are subject to quarantine measures.
Now, imperfect testing differs from this ’virtual testing’ by having lower sensitivity. This means
that a share of infected persons goes unnoticed, and can spread the disease with full force. Whether
this effect leads to a worse outcome on the spread of the epidemic, depends on the relative strength
of lockdown to full quarantine and on sensitivity rate. On the other hand, output is reduced due
to false positives, who are quarantined and removed from workforce but not necessarily at as high
a rate as in lockdown. The epidemic can therefore be controlled more strongly, due to additional
quarantine effect. However, at the same time, achievable output decreases and this cannot be alle-
viated through lockdown measures.
4.2 Case 2: Mass testing without lockdown
This case represents a control approach that relies solely on testing, with the implicit goal of avoid-
ing economically damaging lockdown measures. Here we use as control variable the ’general
testing rate’ τ for different pre-selected time intervals and the same objectives as elsewhere. Due to
the nature of the case, testing sensitivity and specificity will have strong roles on how effective the
strategies can be. As sensitivities, we study the different sensitivity and specificity levels, effects
of delay in appearance of symptoms, faster spread of the epidemic modeled through larger R0 and
delay in start of measures.
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Figure 2: Comparison of achievable outcomes when using lockdown approaches with or without
limited testing program with different sensitivity and specificity levels.
4.2.1 Effects of imperfect tests
In figure 3 we see the effects of imperfect testing on deaths and output in this type of testing based
control approach. In scenario ’mass testing’ perfect testing leads to a situation where there are no
trade offs between deaths and output. When sensitivity is imperfect, i.e. < 1.0, we can see that there
are still no trade offs but the attainable level of objectives is worse for both than with perfect testing.
When specificity decreases, we can see trade offs appearing. This happens because of healthy
persons being false diagnosed as positives and quarantined. Even though this quarantining does
have some health benefits through healthy population being less exposed to infectious people, the
loss in output is strong. This is evinced by the attainable level of deaths being better for imperfect
specificity than for perfect tests(!) but the attainable level of output being significantly worse for
sensitivity at 0.85.
Policy-wise, the higher quality of testing allows testing measures to be initiated stronger earlier,
already when the level of infections within population is lower. In case of low sensitivity, this would
lead to high loss of output due to large number of false positives compared to true positives.
4.2.2 Effects of larger R0
When the epidemic spreads aggresively (R0 = 4.0) the achievable outcomes change, as seen in
figure 8. Now, reaching the lowest death levels requires massive testing efforts together with low
specificity of tests. In many ways, this compares to a partial quarantine as the low specificity tests
push large numbers of people into quarantine as (false) positives (10% of population at maximum
when testing limited to 10 million tests per day). This effect can be seen in figure 9 which describes
the ’lowest deaths’ policies with different sensitivities and specificities. In the beginning of the epi-
demic, the testing rates are kept low by testing capacity constraint, but increase to use the capacity
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Figure 3: Effects of imperfectly sensitive and specific tests on achievable outcomes in mass testing.
Figure 4: Development of epidemic in ’lowest deaths’ policies for mass testing case
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Figure 5: Development of selected compartments for ’lowest deaths’ policies in mass testing case.
Figure 6: Development of epidemic indicators for ’best output’ policies in mass testing case.
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Figure 7: Development of selected compartments for ’best output’ policies in mass testing case.
as the population in tested compartments decreases.
4.2.3 Effects of delay in symptoms
As mass testing is best used to detect infected but unsymptomatic persons, it is interesting to study
the effect of delay in symptom development. The effects are shown in figure 10. In general,
the delay of symptom development improves outcomes. This is caused by asymptomatic infected
persons having more time to recover (instead of developing possibly fatal symptoms). This effect
also creates a situation where testing more with imperfect tests might lead to low gains in number
of deaths but losses in output as people are quarantined.
4.3 Case 3: Contact tracing
We study the performance of contact tracing approach at different efficiency levels η. A summary
of results is shown in 11 where we see the clear improvement in epidemic metrics as a η increases.
In the R0 = 2.5 scenario, we observe practically complete eradication of the epidemic with 100%
tracing efficiency. However, when combined with lockdowns (see figure 12, it seems lockdown
effects diminish the effects of CT from achievable outcome perspective.
4.4 Comparison of approaches
What are the differences then between lockdown and testing based epidemic control approaches?
In figure 13 we see a comparison between the different approaches, and in figure 14 the same for
scenarios with R0 = 4.0 . It should be noted that here, the ’mass testing’ cases have a limit for
maximum testing at 10 000 000 tests per day, implying a daily testing rate of approx 3%, i.e. the
whole population could be tested in one month. Even though this can be considered a large testing
program, it could in extreme cases be much more extensive. The main limitation on this approach
comes from limited testing resources, i.e. allowed number of daily tests, and thus relaxing this
constraint would allow significant improvement in testing numbers, as we can see when looking at
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Figure 8: Performance of mass testing approach with different sensitivity and specificity levels with
R0 = 4.0
Figure 9: Development of compartments in response to mass testing measures (R0 = 4.0)
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Figure 10: Effects of delay in symptom development to achievable outocomes in mass testing case.
Figure 11: Development of epidemic with contact tracing at various efficiencies.
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Figure 12: Effect of contact tracing on achievable outcomes in lockdown based epidemic control.
the ’no limit’ scenarios. With 10 million daily test constraints in place, the approach cannot reach
the same reduction in deaths as lockdown measures that are limited to reducing the meeting rates
to 0.5 meetings per person per time step.
5 Policy implications
There are several policy implications implied by the different case results. Due to the nature of
modeling, these should be considered as inputs for more detailed modeling or as considerations
for decision makers, not as direct recommendations. One possible use case would be to test the
performance of policies adapted from these results on more detailed and/or calibrated models.
5.1 Mass testing can be supported by contact restriction
As shown in figure 13, combination strategy practically dominates the other approaches except for
mass testing with perfect sensitivity and specificity.
In case of a higher value for R0, the differences between possible control approaches become
relatively smaller. However, approaches utilising testing do fare better than pure lockdown. The
effects on achievable outcomes can be seen in figure 14.
5.2 Mass testing is better for economy than lockdowns
Mass testing can improve total output significantly already with limited testing capacity. However,
reaching lowest death rates requires large testing capacity. This is seen in figure 13 by comparing
cases ’mass testing no limit’ and ’mass testing’, where the maximum testing capacity is set to 10
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Figure 13: Comparison of performance of different approaches to epidemic control with R0 = 2.5l
Figure 14: Comparison of performance of different approaches to epidemic control with R0 = 4.0
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000 000 daily tests for population of 340 000 000, i.e. at 3%. The testing rates in ’no limit’ case
translate to testing nearly 25% of population per day.
5.3 Lower specificity tests create trade offs
One interesting observation regarding mass testing schemes is that reducing the specificity of tests
actually improves their maximum performance from the death rate point of view, in case of limited
testing capacity. This is evinced by lower ’lowest deaths’ points in the Pareto fronts for runs with
lower specificity. The effect comes from false positives, who are quarantined, thus protecting them
from infections. However, at the same time, their output is reduced creating a trade off between
deaths and output as a function of testing rate.
The observations imply that decision makers who value health effects have little to gain by
mass testing with without large testing resources. Instead, lockdowns or combined approaches
might serve their targets better. However, output sensitive decision makers would still choose the
mass testing.
5.4 Contact tracing is beneficial by itself, but combining it with lockdowns
might dilute benefits
As show in figure 11, applying contact tracing (CT) for the epidemic significantly improves both
deaths and output. For using CT in combination with other control measures, we haven’t yet been
able to show significant benefits (see figure 12. This might be due to the sensitivity of the system to
e.g. lockdowns when CT is applied and the optimization algorithms inability to modify the controls
in small enough steps. This topic will be researched in more detail in coming publications.
6 Discussion
6.1 Approach
We have presented a methodological framework for heuristic multi-objective optimization of epi-
demic simulators with constraint on resource use and extended compartmental epidemic simulation
by introducing a novel way of modeling contact tracing and imperfect testing.
The strengths of the proposed approach are, that it allows application of multi-objective opti-
mization to a wide range of simulators, optimizing for timing and strength of measures concur-
rently. Different objectives can be kept separate allowing transparent value decisions on Pareto
efficient alternative solutions. The main limiting factor in this approach is the required time and
computational resources for a single simulation run, i.e. the complexity of simulation. However,
the approach allows heuristic optimization of more complex simulators than many other available
approaches. Other limitations are the lack of optimality guarantee and the need for user defined
values for multiple optimization parameters (i.e. correct values cannot be derived analytically or
from literature).
In application areas such as the one presented in this report where the process that is being
modeled, the epidemic, is complex and dynamic, there is often a decision to be made between
optimizing a more simplified process with optimality guarantees versus optimizing a more detailed
process without optimality guarantees. Our approach contributes to the latter alternative. In this
sense, the lack of optimality guarantee should not be considered a critical loss but as allowing the
use of more detailed process model, and thus, better correspondence with the real life process.
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For many of the parameters that the user needs to set, ’good enough’ values can be found
through an iterative process. In practice, many of the default values provided within the used py-
moo package are acceptable. The computational strain can be helped by using parallel computing
resources available through many universities and research organisation, or commercial cloud ser-
vices.
6.2 Performance and convergence of the NSGA-II algorithm
During all run cases and scenarios, the algorithm reached termination criteria convergence before
maximum number of generations (2500) with lower values of R0. However, in scenarios with
R0 = 4.0, convergence was clearly slower and did not reach termination criteria before reaching
maximum generations. The observed difference is understandable in the sense that with higher R0
the effects of controls are stronger, and in this sense, the criteria for termination more strict. This
implies, that the presented results for high R0 might be still improved by longer runs. Also, the
’roughness’ of Pareto fronts hints at this possibility.
The different case and scenario runs were run as array jobs on the Triton cluster, part of
”Science-IT” project of Aalto University School of Science. Each individual run with max 2500
generations completed depending on convergence, and computation node resources, with maxi-
mum runtime of 48 hours 12 minutes (ended at maximum iterations). Different set of optimization
parameters could improve convergence, and use of a larger generation limit would allow more time
for convergence.
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